Introduction
Emerging market economy (EME) financial crises in recent years have sometimes quickly spread to other countries. For example, in the Mexican crisis of 1994/95, the East Asian crisis of 1997/98, and the Russian crisis in 1998, seemingly isolated problems in a core of countries-whether manifested as a stock market crash, a banking panic, a balance-of-payments crisis, or a mixture of all these-often spilled over elsewhere. By contrast, in the recent crises in Turkey and Argentina, spillovers to EMEs were much more limited.
Why do some crises spread quickly and widely, while others are constrained to a narrow group of countries? How is financial distress transmitted across countries? Are these spillover channels changing through time? Do crises spread purely to countries with existing vulnerabilities or do crises open up new fault lines? And can (or should) individual countries or the international community do anything to limit the potential for shocks to have harmful effects elsewhere? To address these questions, we need to enhance our understanding of how crises can be propagated.
A huge volume of theoretical and empirical research has been published in recent years on contagion and country vulnerability (on the former, see, for example, IMF WEO (1999) and Claessens and Forbes (2001) ; on the latter, see Chui (2001) and the IMF Global Financial Stability Report (2002)). The empirical literature on contagion has mainly focused on the broad questions of whether it actually exists and, if so, how it operates. Studies have varied widely in how they define contagion and how they model the transmission of shocks. Not surprisingly, they have produced different views on the incidence of contagion and the relative importance of alternative propagation channels. The vulnerability literature has identified a range of macroeconomic and balance sheet variables which have potential to forewarn of crises, although the forecasting performance of the so-called 'early-warning systems' is at best mixed. This paper draws on elements of both these literatures to propose a systematic framework for assessing the potential vulnerability of emerging market economies (EMEs) to spillover effects from crises elsewhere. Whereas traditional early warning studies can help to spot countries most vulnerable to crisis, our work attempts to pick out those countries that might be 'second-round casualties' of a crisis elsewhere, given their own vulnerabilities and linkages to the 'ground zero' crisis economy. Our review of the theoretical literature identifies a range of potential spillover channels. But our assessment focuses predominantly on more easily measurable linkages through trade and bank lending behaviour. We assess how far quantitative estimates of these channels, combined with evidence on country vulnerabilities, can take us in understanding the quite different dynamics of the crisis in Asia in 1997/98 and more recently in Argentina. We then use this as a diagnostic on the potential value of the framework as a surveillance tool.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out our organising framework for analysing contagious crises, based around a simple shock, transmission, vulnerability and impact framework which we illustrate with a simple model. It also summarises potential theoretical underpinnings for the various elements of this framework. Section 3 reviews empirical work assessing the relative importance of these channels in past crises. Section 4 outlines how previous studies have measured the potential for spillovers and considers a range of estimates of the strength of trade and bank lending linkages across EMEs. Section 5 then considers whether these estimates, together with vulnerability indicators, help us ex post to rationalise crisis spillovers (or their absence) in the Asia and Argentine EME crises. This section also considers how changes in investor behaviour can add to, or reduce, the extent of crisis spillovers. Section 6 draws out some potential policy implications and conclusions.
A framework for assessing external vulnerability
This section sets out a simple analytical framework which characterises crisis spillovers as emanating from an initial external shock which is transmitted to other countries through real or financial channels.
The ultimate impact of any transmitted shock will depend upon the vulnerability of recipient EMEs to the specific shock as well as the responses by policymakers and investors to such shocks.
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Shocks
Theory suggests several general categories of potential external shocks to EMEs. Firstly, shocks may be common to several EMEs or may be country-specific. Examples of common external shocks might include a macroeconomic shock in a major economy-such as a change in US interest rates or a depreciation of the yen-which has potential widespread implications for EMEs. Masson (1998) describes such shocks as 'monsoonal'. Country-specific external shocks might involve currency adjustment or a financial collapse in a strong trade or financial partner. Secondly, external shocks may be fundamentals-based or may result from seemingly exogenous shifts in investor behaviour, including changes in 'risk appetite'. Within the latter category, the potential for so-called 'sunspot crises'-where agent behaviour leads an economy to shift from a good to a bad equilibrium-has been highlighted in second generation currency crises models (see Obstfeld (1986 Obstfeld ( , 1994 ).
To illustrate the transmission of such external shocks, consider the following stylised representation of where actual output (y) equals potential output ( y ) plus the effects of a combination of disturbances.
Specifically, disturbances may arise from shocks to the relative cost of tradeables (t), to the cost of finance (r k ), to foreign income (y*) and to exogenous domestic expenditures (g). For simplicity we consider a linear model although clearly these shocks may interact. The coefficients χ, α, δ, and β represent the elasticities of domestic output to the respective shocks. With the obvious exception of exogenous domestic expenditures, these output disturbances may reflect the impact upon the EME of external shocks. The two main propagation mechanisms of such shocks are trade and financial channels.
Propagation mechanisms
Trade represents an obvious propagation mechanism whereby the output of an EME may be affected by a common shock in a major external trade partner or by the occurrence of a crisis in another economy with which it has trade linkages. These trade effects may occur with a lag. But the expectation of their effects may have an immediate impact upon local asset markets in recipient economies as growth prospects are revised downwards.
There are a number of potential trade channels. A 'competitiveness effect' may arise if the initial crisis economy devalues its currency. The resulting relative price change reduces the competitiveness (both bilaterally and in common export markets) of tradables produced by other economies. This effect is captured for the economy in our stylised model through movements in the relative price of tradeables t.
This reflects changes to bilateral common currency relative unit costs of tradeable goods (s). These changes are weighted by w j to capture both direct and indirect trade interlinkages to the economy in crisis (ie through bilateral and common external markets). The elasticity χ (in Equation 1) indicates the sensitivity of total domestic income to shifts in the relative price of tradeables (ie. vulnerability to terms of trade shocks). Pre-existing external vulnerabilities-such as substantial current account deficitsmight increase the response of output to trade shocks (a shift in χ)-for example, if it raises concern about the sustainability of the trade position. Trade shocks can also be transmitted through reductions in income in a crisis economy which may reduce its demand for imports from all other economies. Within our model this effect is captured through the disturbance to foreign income, y* (Equation 3). Changes in foreign incomes might also affect finance supply to the EME (the latter could also operate through the foreign interest rate terms in r k in Equation 4 below, depending on whether finance is rationed by quantity or by price). The impact of disturbances to individual foreign incomes (y*) will depend on their importance in trade or finance supply (with subscripts T and F respectively) to the EME, as represented by the components of the vector δ: 
A number of authors have developed models drawing on the currency crisis literature to show how these trade spillovers might eventually lead to secondary balance of payments crises. For example, Gerlach and Smets (1995) have extended a traditional 'first-generation' balance of payments crisis model to a three-country setting (with a large economy and two satellite small economies) to show how a speculative attack and depreciation of one currency can spill over to trade partners. In their model, aggregate demand in each country is inversely related to the real exchange rate. As such, a forced depreciation of one currency affects the competitiveness of the other economies whose currencies are fixed, and this can increase speculative pressure and speed up the collapse of their currencies. In particular, spillover effects are more potent the stronger are trade linkages and the lower the degree of real and nominal wage flexibility. The former factor relates to the strength of trade linkages, both bilateral and via competition in common third-markets; the latter relates to the vulnerability of recipient economies to transmitted nominal shocks.
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Turning to the other main propagation mechanism, potential transmission of shocks through financial channels has received substantial attention in recent years. Models typically explore how crises can be propagated by the responses of creditors/investors with multi-country exposures ('common creditors') to shocks to part of their portfolio. In the stylised framework of Equation 1, the financial transmission of shocks may occur via r k (a generic disturbance term for cost of finance influences on output). In addition, as discussed above, depending on whether there is quantity or price rationing of finance, it may also happen through y*, with foreign income shocks affect the supply of foreign finance.
Disturbances to total financing costs might arise from shocks to the cost of either domestic or overseas finance-represented by a vector r (see Equation 4 ). For overseas finance shocks, a distinction may again be made between direct and indirect shocks. For example, a rise in US interest rates, r US , represents a common and direct external shock. Alternatively the overseas finance shock may be indirect-a crisis in one EME may result in common creditors changing their required return on their exposures to other EMEs. Losses on lending to Argentina, for example, might affect lending rates for other EMEs. The likelihood and extent of such readjustments may be dependent upon the balance sheet vulnerability of the common creditor to the initial shock. The impact on our model economy of shocks to the costs of different financing sources will depend on its sensitivity to each source of finance. This can be represented by a vector ψ-which represents the share of each finance source in total finance.
The impact of shocks to finance costs on output is determined by α, the elasticity of interest-sensitive expenditures. This elasticity parameter in turn may depend on structural features of the corporate sector. For example, if corporate balance sheets are already heavily indebted, a shock to the cost of finance may have a greater impact on investment and output.
where ) , , , (
Notice that domestic interest rate (r d ) is included as an alternative source to foreign financing.
Various theoretical models have been proposed to explain crisis propagation via financial channels.
One set of models has examined the role of liquidity shortages in crisis spillovers. For example, Garber and Grilli (1989) and Valdés (1997) have extended the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) bank-run model to an international setting. In their models, a bank run in one country can lead to fire sales of long-term assets in a second country to replenish investor liquidity. This can lead to capital outflows in the second country, higher interest rates and ultimately result in a secondary crisis. Similarly, Allen and Gale (2000) have considered overlapping claims of different regions within the international banking system through interbank markets. When one region suffers a banking crisis, the other regions suffer a loss because their claims on the troubled region fall in value. In extreme cases, the crisis can pass from region to region and become contagion.
Other models have explored how co-ordination failure among creditors can cause crises to spread, particularly in an environment of incomplete and/or asymmetric information between creditors and debtors (or among creditors themselves). 4 For example, Calvo and Mendoza (2000) have used the Banjeree (1992) model of financial herding behaviour to analyse crisis spillovers in global capital markets. They assume that investors decisions about their country portfolios are affected by two key factors: a fixed country-specific information cost and a variable performance benefit (cost) of obtaining a mean portfolio return higher (lower) than the mean return on the market portfolio. They show that investors' incentives to follow the herd rather than gather country-specific information grow stronger as the world capital market expands. Moreover, small rumours can trigger herd behaviour among investors which can shift a given economy from a good equilibrium to a bad one, with large capital outflows unrelated to economic fundamentals. For example, a sudden crisis in one country may lead investors to reevaluate the potential for crisis in similar countries-this 'wake-up call' may lead uninformed investors to withdraw funds independent of developments in fundamentals.
Vulnerabilities
The above discussion highlights that one factor that may influence whether a crisis spreads is the strength of trade and/or financial linkages between countries. But strong linkages are not a sufficient condition for crisis: vulnerabilities and the responses of investors and policymakers are likely to be the arbiters of whether a transmitted shock from a crisis EME leads to a crisis in another recipient EME.
In our stylised economy, the likelihood of an external shock actually leading to an output disturbance in an EME will clearly depend on its structural characteristics represented by the vector of parameters in equations (1) to (4). 5 For example, EMEs with substantial trade demand will be sensitive to terms of trade shocks whilst an EME that sources most of its finance domestically will be relatively less exposed and less directly affected by international credit supply shocks. As mentioned above, the composition of, and balance sheet strength of creditors may be an additional vulnerability affecting the likelihood of propagation of financial shocks via international investors. For example, if problems in one EME result in losses to international creditors, sound initial investor balance sheets may help prevent these shocks being passed on to other EMEs. Conversely, investors with balance sheets that are already impaired may help propagate crisis.
4 Schinasi and Smith (2000) demonstrate using a textbook portfolio allocation model how leveraged investors will reduce their investments in many risky assets when hit by an adverse shock. However, Calvo and Mendoza (2000) emphasis that contagion only occurs under a combination of information asymmetry and particular institutional or regulatory features of financial markets. For example, the gain of paying for costly country-specific information declines as the market grows only if investors face binding short-selling constraints. In this context, regulations such as short-selling constraints which aim to reduce volatile capital flows can in fact contribute to exacerbate the problem. 5 The impact of shocks on output volatility will also depend on variances and covariances between different shocks.
For shocks that do affect the output of non-crisis EMEs, country vulnerabilities related to the type of shock transmitted may determine whether a secondary crisis develops. For example, for shocks propagated by trade channels certain structural features of the recipient country-such as bilateral and third-economy trade links with a crisis EME-together with its initial trade/macroeconomic position are likely to determine its potential for a spillover crisis (see Diagram 1). For instance, a country which has extensive bilateral trade with a crisis country and substantial overlap in third markets, where the initial trade balance is weak and domestic growth slow, is relatively more susceptible to any given traderelated shock. Similarly, the impact of transmitted financial shocks will depend on linkages identified in our stylised framework above-such as the geographical composition of financial obligations-as well as vulnerabilities such as initial liquidity positions and the maturity structure of obligations. Other fragilities not explicitly identified in the stylised economy above are also likely to be relevant. These may include the constraints on the reactions of EME policymakers. They may also include behavioural reactions to the initial crisis, for example in terms of investor 'herding' channels of crisis transmission, financial and/or macroeconomic similarities between an EME and a crisis EME may be a further fragility in a world of incomplete information. To summarise, the simple analytical framework presented above helps illustrate ways in which we might assess the potential for a crisis in one EME to spill over to another EME. Firstly, it suggests that we should seek to identify the potential for shocks from a crisis economy to hit an EME. That suggests we should examine the strength of ex ante real and financial linkages between a crisis economy and other EMEs, both direct and indirect through third economies. Obviously an examination of ex ante linkages can only offer a first pass at assessing potential for shock transmission: in some crises new (or strengthened) linkages will open up-for example, when investors reassess the fundamental vulnerabilities of EMEs following a crisis elsewhere. These 'crisis-contingent' channels are inevitably hard to assess, but pre-existing linkages perhaps provide some metric. Secondly, we need to assess specific vulnerabilities of EMEs to shocks transmitted from a crisis EME. Taken together, analysis of the nature and strength of linkages from a crisis EME to other economies, along with an assessment of pre-existing vulnerabilities in those economies, may help determine whether an initial crisis will spread elsewhere. Other important determinants, which are extremely difficult to quantify in such an ex ante manner, include the potential responses of policymakers and investors to the initial shock and crisis transmission.
Empirical evidence on spillover channels
What empirical evidence is there on the relative importance of different shocks, transmission mechanisms and vulnerabilities? Results are mixed, varying according to the time period considered in studies, the particular quantification of propagation channels used (discussed in more detail in the next section) and the definition and measure of contagion/asset market disturbance adopted. Despite these caveats, a number of general conclusions can be drawn (Table A summarises some key findings). Eichengreen et al (1996) , Glick and Rose (1999) and Hernandez and Valdes (2001) find strong evidence for the importance of trade linkages in a wide cross-section of countries (both developed and emerging) over the past three decades, but less evidence for a role for financial linkages.
However, the former two results may reflect the inclusion in these studies of developed market crises where trade interlinkages have historically been stronger than in emerging economies. It may also reflect lower relative levels of financial integration in previous decades.
Studies focusing explicitly on EMEs and covering more recent time periods have found greater evidence for the significance of financial interlinkages. In the absence of comprehensive data on overall financial interlinkages across economies, many studies of financial channels have focused on cross-border bank lending linkages, particularly those operating via major common lenders. For example, in a study covering both industrial and emerging economies, Caramazza et al (2000) found that common bank creditor indicators had a significant impact on the probability of crises whilst the trade channel was weak. 10 Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) found evidence of common lender effects during the Thai, Mexican and Russian crises. 11 Moreover, they find that trade linkages are in general significant when tested in the absence of common creditor linkages but are not always significant after controlling for common creditor channels. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) argue that financial linkages help explain spillovers to Argentina and Brazil in the 1994 Mexican crisis and Indonesia after the 1997 Thai devaluation as trade links were relatively weak in both cases. However, they note that it is difficult 8 Caramazza et al (2000) provide an exception. In their benchmark model they find the current account significant and a trade linkage variable not. As an extension they include a term multiplying the two variables which they find to be significant. As with the benchmark model of Caramazza et al (2000) , other papers which have incorporated vulnerabilities and linkages have generally regressed the dependent variable upon vulnerabilities and linkages as separate variables. Others have controlled for fundamentals first, then examined linkage variables, for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) . 9 The results are also complicated by data characteristics and econometric problems with the various techniques that have been used. See, Rigobon (2001) for a comprehensive review. 10 Using the industrial economy sub-sample they are unable to replicate some of the results of Eichengreen et al (1996) , which they report may suggest a significant difference in the nature of crises between developing and emerging economies. 11 Although the results are dependent upon the specification of the common creditor linkage indicator. For example, when comparing different common creditor indicators with a probit model (excluding trade linkages), they find that the absolute funds competition index is the most highly significant indicator in the Mexican and Russian crisis with the relative funds competition index most significant for the Thai crisis (see Box 2 below for definitions of these indicators).
empirically to differentiate between the impact of financial versus trade linkages as most countries that are linked in trade are also linked in finance.
12 Table A Selected empirical evidence on crisis spillovers Study Data Methodology Results Caramazza et al (2000) 20 industrialised economies and 41 EMEs. Data from 1990-98.
Pooled probit with exchange market pressure (EMP) indicator
Common creditor indicators and financial weakness (particularly reserve adequacy) have significant impact on the probability of a crisis having controlled for fundamentals and trade linkages. Eichengreen et al (1996) 20 industrialised economies. Data from 1959-93.
Pooled probit with EMP crisis indicator
Contagious currency crises spread mainly as a function of trade links rather than through macro similarities. Forbes (2001) 58 economies (around half developed, half EME). Data from July 1994 to June 1999.
Pooled regression of average weekly abnormal stock returns in crisis periods (which are defined by an EMP indicator)
Three trade linkage measures are tested (see Box A for definitions )-the 'competitiveness' effect is always negative and highly significant; the income effect negative and significant; and the cheap import effect is positive but usually insignificant. The EME policy response to a crisis is a key determinant of the significance of these effects.
Fratszscher (2000) 24 EMEs (Asia, Latin America and Europe Trade channel appears consistently important in explaining the incidence of crisis and also, from the regression on a continuous EMP indicator, the intensity of crisis.
Hernandez and
Valdes (2001) 17 EMEs for equity indices and 8-14 countries for EMBI data. Three-months of weekly data around each of the Thai, Russian and Brazilian crises.
Pooled regression of financial market variables on corresponding variables in other economies weighted by a transmission channel indicator
Bond spreads and local equity prices are used as dependent variables. Using bond spreads: With competing channels, trade competition coefficient is not significant from zero. Common creditor effects are a more important channel. The absolute competition for funds measure (see Box B for definitions) is most relevant for the Thai crisis; the relative measure is more relevant for crises in Russia and Brazil. Using equities: Financial competition effects are significant in all crises. Trade and regional effects important in the Thai and Brazilian crises. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) 20 countries-Asian and Latin American EME and 5 industrialised economies. Data from 1970-98.
When there is a high proportion (over 50%) of contemporaneous crises, conditioning on financial interlinkages provides the greatest increase in probability of crises (with the common creditor greatest then market correlation measures). The improvement from conditioning on bilateral trade linkages is less. Third party trade linkages provide a relatively small improvement on the probability conditional on crises elsewhere. Rigobon (2001) Bond spread data: 7 Latin American EMEs from April 1995 to July 1998. Equity data: 13 Latin American and Asian EMEs from July 1994 to end-1998.
Based on change in covariance matrices.
Trade linkage is a positive and marginally significant factor. The contribution of common shocks to the variance rises in high volatility periods. Using equity data, it is impossible to reject the hypothesis that all the coefficients on common shocks are equal to zero. With bond spread data, it is impossible to reject that the coefficient on common shocks is equal to that on the US interest rate. Also the US interest rate explains much idiosyncratic variation. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) 42-85 EMEs (varying sample size) with data covering Mexican, Thai and Russian crises Pooled probit using EMP crisis indicator.
Probit: Common creditor indicators are significantly associated with a higher contagion probability. Trade links are less significant (not significant at all in the Asian crisis once common creditor channels have been controlled for).
There have been an increasing number of studies examining non-bank financial links. For example Froot et al (2001) examined State Street Bank and Trust data on daily portfolio flows into developed and emerging markets which they found to have a strong correlation across regions (which increased during the Asian crisis although not during the Mexican crisis). They also found that flows were related to past returns in the recipient economy. In their examinations of emerging market mutual fund flows Kaminsky et al (2000 and found similar evidence with spillovers to a number of Latin American EMEs during the Mexican crisis and much broader spillovers following the Thai crisis. During crisis periods they found evidence of relatively high levels of contemporaneous 'momentum trading' (ie buying assets which are currently outperforming and selling underperformers) and of 'contagion trading' (when asset sales in one EME follow asset price falls in another EME). Financial interlinkages via foreign direct investment links have received little attention in relation to crisis propagation. Whilst in part this reflects data availability, it may also be due to lower mobility of FDI and hence its lesser importance in short-term crisis periods.
Despite the general results of Table A , a key lesson from empirical work seems to be that results are highly sensitive to how propagation mechanisms are specified and how crisis contagion is measured.
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On the latter, Hernandez and Valdes (2001) find that trade linkages are insignificant when bond spreads are indicators of crisis but significant (during some crises) when equity market variables are used.
Taken together, these findings may be indicative of substantial measurement issues in calibrating interlinkages or they may simply reflect the operation of distinct channels within a generic class of linkages (for example, the relative importance of third party versus bilateral trade linkages).
Alternatively, they may reflect the varying importance of certain asset markets across EME regionsfor example, bond markets are more developed in Latin America than in Asia.
In conclusion, the broad range of theoretical mechanisms for crisis spillovers and the mixed empirical evidence on the importance of alternative channels suggests that EME surveillance should be informed by a wide-ranging set of measures of potential linkages. As such, in the next section we review how empirical studies have actually measured spillovers and calculate some estimates of cross-EME interlinkages using readily available data.
particularly ahead of the Asian crisis, may reflect the widespread use of trade-related finance.
This section presents some potentially useful quantifications of ex ante real and financial linkages, as used in past empirical work. Given the mixed empirical evidence on the importance of different linkages over time, we calculate a range of alternative measures. As outlined in our organising framework above, susceptibility to a shock is not sufficient for a country to suffer a crisis: crisis is a joint outcome of shock, transmission, vulnerability and behavioural response of investors and policymakers. In Section 5 below we illustrate this point by combining evidence on interlinkages with estimates of country vulnerabilities in some simple case studies of recent emerging market crises. These studies offer both an illustration and evaluation of our framework as a surveillance tool.
Measuring interlinkages Trade linkages
The empirical studies of trade crisis propagation mechanisms discussed in Section 3 employed a range of measures, varying in their degree of sophistication, in an attempt to calibrate the trade interlinkages identified in Section 2. Potential measures using aggregate data could range from a country's openness, its bilateral trade linkages with a crisis economy through to a calibration of common third market linkages. Finally, using disaggregated data, industry level linkages could be examined. 
Openness measure
The simplest measure of trade channels is openness, ie the ratio of total trade to GDP. 
Alternatively, in order to consider both exports by an EME to the crisis economy and exports of the crisis economy to an EME a measure of bilateral exports relative to total exports may be constructed. Fratzscher (2000) uses this formula to indicate bilateral trade within a wider trade measure (see below).
Others focus on similarities in levels of trade. For example, Glick and Rose (1999) calculate a simple bilateral trade index which increases as bilateral exports between the two economies become closer. Third-market trade effects Simple trade cluster dummies were used by Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) to indicate third-market trade effects. Countries were classified in a third-party Asia cluster or a third-party Latin American cluster on the basis of common trade patterns (for example the relative importance of Japan and the US as third markets respectively). Glick and Rose (1999) measure third market competition between country i and crisis economy 0 as a weighted average of the absolute importance of third markets k to countries 0 and i. The first term is a weighting proportional to the importance of third market k in total trade of countries 0 and i. The second term is a proxy for export overlap (in a manner similar to the Grubel-Lloyd (1975) measure of intraindustry trade) between the countries 0 and i in third market k. The higher the value of the index the greater the third-market competition between the two economies. Finally, Eichengreen et al (1996) use the weights in IMF real effective exchange rate indices. These weights reflect direct trade from country i to j plus the relative importance to country j of exports to a third country k (with which i is a major trade partner). These trade measures are weighted by relative unit labour costs.
Industry level linkages
Several studies have attempted to capture industry level trade effects. For example, Forbes (2001) calculates an index where the first term in the brackets captures the potential impact of crisis in the initial crisis economy on each industry globally (through the importance of the crisis economy to that industry) as a whole. The index also incorporate a role for vulnerability: the second term captures the exposure of economy i to each industry. The index is scaled relative to the maximum value in the sample: where the first term indicates third market competition (j is a stronger competitor with i the larger its export market share by industry in the third market and the larger the dependence of that industry in country i on exports to the third market). The second term indicates the degree of bilateral trade between economy i and j.
Financial linkages
As noted earlier, most empirical tests of financial linkages have focused on banking sector and common creditor interlinkages. This probably reflects a desire to use consistent readily available data split by creditor across EMEs and across time periods which is not always possible with data on non-bank financial positions. In the absence of consistent national EME data on banking exposures, studies have typically used the consolidated international banking statistics compiled by the Bank for International Settlement for developed economies. Although these data do identify creditor countries for different EMEs, they are not perfect: they do not cover local exposures of BIS banks, off-balance sheet positions, indirect exposures or offsetting guarantees and there are gaps in data availability. Most importantly they do not record intra-EME financial exposures although, as Fratzscher (2000) notes, this is probably less problematic given that a substantial proportion of funding to emerging markets comes from developed markets.
Common creditor effects can be split into two main types. 'Type I' effects measure direct lending between BIS area countries and emerging markets, which might provide insights on potential spillovers from banking instability in developed economies to EMEs. 'Type II' common creditor links, measuring indirect linkages between EMEs through a shared lender, are of more direct interest to our focus on EME spillovers. In this case, a crisis in one economy might lead a creditor to withdraw credit from other economies perhaps in anticipation of similar problems in that economy or as a means of raising liquidity to cover losses. Measures of common creditor channels between a crisis economy and another EME are usually based on some index of a creditor's pre-crisis exposures to a crisis economy and the pre-crisis dependence of the second EME on this common creditor. Box B summarises some popular such measures used in empirical studies.
Box B: Indices of common creditor linkages
Common creditor measures divide into those which focus on interlinkages between an initial crisis economy and other EMEs via a single common lender (defined as the creditor with the largest absolute claims on the ground-zero crisis economy) and those which attempt to combine exposures to different common creditors. In the indices below, country 0 can be thought of as the original crisis EME, country i another EME and country k is the common creditor. Formulations are adaptations of originals.
Single common creditors
Caramazza et al (1999) present a simple index of EME linkages via the single (largest) creditor k to crisis country j. I the first term measures the exposure, relative to GDP, of country i's dependency on the common creditor. The second term measures the exposure of the common creditor on the crisis economy relative to the common creditor's total capital (and hence might provide some information on the likelihood of margin calls). This formulation is proposed to address some perceived flaws in BISAB i in considering exposures as a proportion of total lending rather than relative to GDP (for the borrower) or capital (for the lender) and in disregarding the exposures of the lenders to the crisis economy. where DC indicates developing economies. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1999) follow the approach of Glick and Rose (1999) to trade interlinkages, offering two measures of multi-creditor bank links between EMEs. They offer two measures of creditor interlinkages which distinguish between absolute or relative competition for funds available. (2001) note that these different measures reflect different propagation mechanisms: under the former, in which a larger borrower represents greater competition for funds, the propagation mechanism may be margin calls if fund supply is limited; under the latter, which indicates similarity in borrowing patterns (as a share of total borrowing), the propagation mechanism may be through informational spillovers.
Multiple common creditors
For financial propagation across non-bank market channels (for example through portfolio flows) some studies have used pre-crisis equity market correlations as a proxy for potential interlinkages between markets. For example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) have identified clusters of markets with relatively high pre-crisis equity market correlations as having strong financial interlinkages (although they could equally reflect strong real interlinkages). As recognised in these studies, such measures are far from perfect, for example they are based on correlations in a predefined period (and hence may not pick up increased or new financial propagation mechanisms arising during a crisis) and do not take into account market liquidity.
Evidence on potential linkages Trade channels
How strong are trade linkages between EMEs? How have they shifted over time? What is the relative importance of bilateral and third market linkages? And how diversified are EME export markets?
These questions can potentially be addressed by examination of the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics which offer a comprehensive database on merchandise trade flows across both developed and emerging market economies.
As noted above, trade openness is perhaps the simplest measure of EME exposure to external shocks.
Despite fluctuations in world demand and shifts in exchange rates, in general dependence on external demand has increased substantially over time for all the major EME regions. Trade openness is particularly high in economies in non-Japan Asia (with the exception of China and India) and emerging Europe; and relatively lower in Latin America.
In terms of intra-country trade linkages, these may be bilateral or operate via common export markets.
Chart 1 illustrates one measure of the extent of bilateral trade between EMEs. With the exception of strong intra-regional links in Asia (which mainly reflect trade in intermediate goods, particularly high technology products, ultimately destined to developed economy markets) and bilateral trade links between Argentina and Brazil, intra-EME trade is quite low. This suggests that crisis spillovers through trade channels are perhaps most likely to occur through shifts in relative competitiveness in developed economy markets. (a) Defined as direct exports from country i to region j as proportion of total exports by i. Similarly, much of Latin America has strong linkages with the US. For Asian EMEs, linkages with the EU and the US are again substantial and, whilst Japan remains an important market, its relative importance for non-Japan Asia has declined steadily over time. Finally, there are obviously some strong EME trade linkages with developed economies at the product level, as was recently exemplified by marked falls in Asian EME growth in 2001 in the wake of the global slowdown in demand for hightechnology products, although we do not consider these links here.
14 To capture the potential for trade competition in third markets, we calculate one potential composite index of third-market linkages developed by Glick and Rose (1999) . Their relative tradeshare index (described in Box A above) increases (to a maximum value of 1) as the proportions of exports from a crisis economy and another EME to third markets become closer or as the share of exports from these economies to third markets rise. We use aggregate trade data in Chart 2 and do not take into account the different product markets in which countries may compete. In summary, these data offer an interesting stock take of EME trade interlinkages. They suggest that in general trade spillovers from crisis EMEs are perhaps more likely to operate via major economy third markets rather than via bilateral links. In addition, EME trade competition in these markets tends to follow a regional pattern, with the strongest overlaps possibly among the externally-orientated Asian
EMEs. And in terms of vulnerabilities, Latin American EMEs perhaps have the least diversified external demand for their products. But these data also hide as much as they reveal. For example, the product composition of exports is likely to be an important determinant of susceptibility to demand shocks, as evidenced in 2001 by the impact of the global high-tech market slowdown on Asian EMEs.
Financial channels
Sections 2 and 3 noted the different potential direct and indirect channels for financial spillovers from crisis countries to other EMEs. Data availability makes these financial linkages substantially harder to measure than trade relationships. For example, there are few consistent sources of information on intra-EME financial exposures, although as noted above this is probably less problematic given that a substantial proportion of external funding to emerging markets comes from developed markets.
Moreover, even data we do have on developed economy exposures tend to focus on banking exposures rather other asset holdings. This has become more problematic as the composition of EME debt stocks has shifted since the late 1980s increasingly towards bond, portfolio investments and FDI.
In terms of bank lending, the consolidated cross-border and local currency lending data compiled by the Bank for International Settlement record exposures of banks in BIS reporting countries to developing economies (DEs) back to as far as 1985. These data also permit analysis of lending by major creditors (see Table C ). Using the foreign claims data (which includes both cross-border and local exposures), the US is the largest creditor to DEs (focusing on Latin America). Germany also has substantial exposures to most EME regions, but they are particularly significant for DEs in Europe (see Table C ).
Despite its run down in claims since the mid-1990s, Japan remains a major creditor to emerging Asia (as is the UK particularly to Hong Kong). Elsewhere, Spain has increased its bank lending exposures in recent years, predominantly in Latin America. The scale of these developed economy exposures and the relatively low level of intra-EME bank exposures, suggest that financial spillovers are perhaps most likely to operate via these major lenders.
As noted earlier, the impact of losses on exposures to one EME on other EMEs depends on how major creditors respond. It may be that losses lead to withdrawals of lending predominantly to large EME creditors; to all EME creditors proportionately; to those who appear similar in risk characteristics; or to none at all. Regardless, those most vulnerable to changes are likely to be EMEs with high finance dependencies on the developed economy creditor.
As discussed earlier, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) have proposed indices which attempt to capture the potential for finance spillovers via all major EME creditors. Their indices follow the approach of Glick and Rose (1999) to trade interlinkages by calibrating the extent of similarity in finance dependencies of EMEs on common creditors (see Box B). They offer both relative and absolute indices of finance similarity, each reflecting different potential propagation mechanisms. As noted in Box B, under the former, the propagation mechanism may be through informational spillovers. By contrast, under the latter, the propagation mechanism may be margin calls funded out of these large (liquid) credits. (a) Consolidated foreign claims data used. Calculated using sample of 13 major published reported common creditors as composing the "total claims" on economy (This has been used to overcome problems of breaks in the reporting sample when looking at time series). Common creditors are Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and the US.
As an example, Chart 3 presents values for Van Rijckeghem and Weder's relative index. This suggests strong intra-regional similarities although there are also some notable inter-regional linkages.
15 For example, the index yields relatively high values for South Africa and Turkey with some Asian and Latin American EMEs. By contrast, Poland and Russia appear to have limited extra-regional lending similarities.
As discussed earlier, systematic data on non-bank financial holdings, broken down by creditor, are not readily available. However, country weights in widely tracked international equity and bond indices provide one illustration of the relative importance of different EMEs to global investors -and hence the potential for intra-EME linkages via international investors. Latin American EMEs dominate foreign currency sovereign bond markets. Asian EMEs generally have higher relative equity market capitalisations, although these are also significant in Brazil and Mexico (Chart 4). 
Chart 4 Emerging market weights-sovereign bonds and equity indices(a)
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The Asian crisis included periods of speculative pressure and crisis in a number of economies, complicating the identification of a initial crisis economy. For the purposes of this case study, we focus solely on EME interlinkages with Thailand given that the Baht depreciation pre-dated others in the region (see Chart 5). Thailand's large current account deficit, high short-term indebtedness and financial fragility contributed to speculation against the Baht from as early as June 1996. In early 1997
the authorities attempted to support the Baht through market intervention, particularly in the forward market. Intensified speculative pressures led to rapid depletion of reserves and the brief imposition of capital controls, before the Baht was finally devalued on 2 July 1997.
Chart 5
Exchange rate against US dollar (1 Jan 1997=100) 16 For comprehensive studies of the Asian Crisis see, for example, Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999) and Goldstein (1998) .
Linkages
As noted earlier, most Asian EMEs have strong intra-regional trade linkages. Thailand was no exception in 1996 with around 37% of merchandise exports destined to non-Japan Asia. Export links with EMEs outside Asia were much lower. Thailand's other major export markets were the US, EU and Japan (each accounting for around 16-18% total exports). The Glick-Rose common market trade share index suggests that other Asian EMEs were perhaps most at risk of third market trade competitiveness spillovers from the Baht devaluation.
In terms of financial linkages, Japan had by far the largest absolute financial exposure to Thailand with BIS foreign claims of US$39.5bn in 1996 Q4 (about 25% of its BIS claims on developing countries).
The next largest exposure was the US at US$8.4bn (4.6% of its total claims on developing countries).
Asian EMEs were the most dependent on Japan as a source of funds. And aggregating across all common creditors using the Van Rijckeghem and Weder relative index, Indonesia and Korea had the most similar financial exposures to Thailand.
Taken together, these measures suggest that Asian EMEs were by far the most strongly linked to Thailand. Linkages with other EMEs (through these channels) were much more limited, although Brazil and South Africa perhaps had the next strongest exposures (see Table D) . Vulnerabilities Table E provides some summary vulnerability measures for our top ten countries by interlinkages. With the Thai devaluation occurring in July 1997 data are provided for the pre-crisis year of 1996.
Most EMEs in our sample experienced strong GDP growth in 1996 and relatively stable inflation (in the range of 5-10%). But many had substantial current account deficits, particularly some of the Asian EMEs (Singapore's strong surplus was a notable exception). And in the lead up to the Thai crisis, moderate inflation and nominal exchange rate stability had resulted in some real exchange rate appreciation in many Asian economies. Fiscal positions in most Asian EMEs appeared relatively strong. With the exception of India, central government budget surpluses had been the norm in the years up to and including 1996 and debt levels were also relatively low (not indicated in the table due to incomplete data availability)-although this ignores public sector contingent liabilities in financial sectors which subsequently crystallised during the crisis. Outside Asia, Brazil and South Africa had large deficits and relatively high public sector debt (at around 30% and 50% of GDP respectively).
With hindsight many Asian EMEs appear to have had serious external balance sheet vulnerabilities.
Along with Thailand, Indonesia and Korea had insufficient reserves to cover short-term debt. And short-term debt typically accounted for over 50% of total debt. 17 Indonesia and Korea (as well as China) also had high ratios of M2 to reserves. Of the non-Asian EMEs, South Africa appeared particularly weak on reserve coverage.
Many Asian EMEs also had internal vulnerabilities. The financial strength ratings of our EME sample were relatively weak (and many were to fall further as the extent of financial system problems was 17 Singapore and Hong Kong's high level of short-term external debt reflected, in part, their roles as financial centres.
revealed), particularly in China, India, Indonesia and Korea. Pre-crisis growth in private sector claims and M2 had been strong, especially in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.
Evaluation
Does the evidence suggest that the interaction of trade and financial ties with related vulnerabilities was a contributory factor in the initial spread of the Thai crisis? Given the duration and multifaceted development of the Asian crisis we restrict ourselves to some basic observations. We do not attempt to analyse the policy choices made by different countries in response to the crisis (which certainly interacted with ex ante vulnerabilities and interlinkages to determine final outcomes).
Charts 6 and 7 present a selection of some key economic and financial ties to Thailand and associated vulnerabilities of major EMEs in 1996. The blue markers in Chart 6 denote the strength of shared market trade linkages to Thailand and related current account vulnerabilities of major EMEs in 1996.
Similarly, Chart 7 shows EMEs' dependence on bank lending from Japan (the major common creditor in the crisis) against their related vulnerability of liquid foreign exchange reserves coverage of shortterm foreign currency debt obligations. Economies located closer to the bottom left hand corner of each chart would perhaps be expected to face greater spillovers given the conjunction of a strong linkage and high relevant vulnerability. These charts suggest that trade and bank linkages, together with vulnerabilities, go some way towards identifying those Asian economies -Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines -that experienced the most severe spillovers from the Thailand crisis. They had both relatively strong trade links with Thailand and the vulnerabilities of relatively large current account deficits. Many also had de facto currency pegs that may have constrained scope for adjustment to shocks. Similarly the Asian crisis EMEs also tended to have strong banking sector dependencies on Japan (Thailand's main BIS-area bank creditor) which may have interacted with generally low reserve coverage of short-term debt. Some other economies were relatively strongly linked to Thailand but perhaps had lower vulnerability to spillovers. For example, China and India had relatively high reserves to short-term debt and were less vulnerable to exchange rate pressures given their capital controls. Singapore, and particularly Hong Kong, which had relatively strong trade and bank creditor ties with Thailand, faced speculative pressure during the crisis but had liquid and well-capitalised financial systems which helped them to contain spillovers.
In terms of ex post evidence on the operation of trade or financial channels during the crisis, BIS data suggest a significant reduction in Japanese claims on Thailand (down 40% from 1997 Q2 to 1998 Q2).
There were also sizeable reductions in claims on the rest of non-Japan Asia, with the exception of China and the Philippines. As context, BIS claims on developing countries rose by 3% over this period (with sharp rises for Argentina, Poland and Turkey). In terms of export performance, exports from Indonesia, South Africa, Korea and Brazil weakened substantially following the crisis.
The Argentine Crisis
The crisis in Argentina was the culmination of a protracted period of deepening financing difficulties. Despite the severe economic problems facing Argentina, spillovers to other major EMEs were relatively limited.
18 Indeed, using asset price indicators, Chart 8 shows that the correlation between Argentine and other EME US denominated sovereign bond spreads fell markedly as the crisis intensified in late 2001. 
Linkages
Brazil had very strong direct trade linkages with Argentina in 2000 -and indeed has seen some decline in exports to Argentina in the wake of the crisis -but other direct trade linkages with EMEs were more limited than those from Thailand in 1997 (Table F) 18 18 countries are included in this part of the study (Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela) . At endApril 2002 countries from this sample had combined weights of 85% and 78% in the JP Morgan Chase & Co Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) Global and the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Emerging Markets Free (EMF) equity index respectively. Hong Kong and Singapore are not included in these EME indices, but are considered in this study given their trade and financial linkages to EMEs. However, Uruguay which has experienced some spillovers from problems in Argentina is not included given its very low weight or omission from these indices.
In terms of bank linkages, data on foreign BIS claims suggest that the US had the largest bank exposure to Argentina at US$25.3bn in 2000 Q4 (about 12% of its BIS claims on developing countries).
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Spanish banks' foreign claims were US$ 23.1bn (also about 12% of its BIS claims on developing countries). The US and Spain represented around 27% and 25% of total BIS foreign claims upon Argentina. Dependence on the US was relatively geographically dispersed and in general, Latin
American countries were less dependent on US lending than Asian economies were on Japanese lending The picture on EME vulnerabilities is somewhat mixed. Growth and fiscal positions are arguably little changed overall from the time of the Asia crisis, although there have been some notable declines in inflation across economies. By contrast, external vulnerabilities -perhaps most critical for international spillovers -are generally somewhat lower. Table G In summary, analysis of interactions of linkages and vulnerabilities appears to be a useful starting point for assessing the potential for crisis spillovers. But it is only a starting point. It is subject to two types of errors, ie it can predict spillovers when none are realised and, perhaps more worryingly, not predict spillovers when they are realised.
One reason for these errors may be that the selection of readily measurable trade and financial linkages and vulnerability measures presented here are a subset, albeit an important one, of the range of linkages between EMEs and their related vulnerabilities. The analysis would benefit from assessment of a richer set of vulnerabilities-including less readily measurable indicators of structural reform progress and balance sheet structures-in countries at risk on the basis of linkages. On linkages themselves, the potential for product level trade spillovers is not considered. For finance linkages, off-balance sheet bank exposures, perhaps via credit default swap markets, are omitted. Furthermore, evidence on nonbank spillovers, particularly on the counterparties of these financial flows, is only partial. And intra-EME financial linkages have not been calibrated. Although, as discussed in section 4, some empirical studies have attempted to examine these linkages in more detail, further transparency and data availability would provide important insights into the process of EME crisis spillovers for both market participants and policymakers. As these gaps are filled they will add further detail to the analysis of spillovers within this generic framework.
Investor behaviour
Another potentially telling reason why the linkage and vulnerability analysis above can only offer a partial explanation of past crisis dynamics is that it does not explicitly consider investor behaviour. For example, the financial linkages measures presented provide information on the scale of investor exposures to EMEs, but do not indicate their actual portfolio behaviour in a crisis. Considering potential changes in investor behaviour may provide important insights into the spillover process.
Along with the lower coincidence of high vulnerabilities and high linkages, behavioural changes amongst investors may have contributed to the absence of spillovers from the Argentina crisis.
Evidence from the dispersion of spreads on internationally traded EME bonds is supportive of the view that investors have differentiated between Argentina and other EME debtors, particularly relative to earlier crisis periods.
What might explain this shift in behaviour? One argument might be that policy initiatives by the IMF and EMEs following previous crises have led to improvements in country-surveillance. For example, increased EME data dissemination may mean that it is now less costly for investors to differentiate between EME credits.
Notwithstanding increased differentiation between credits, sudden crises can lead to disorderly selling in thin markets, perhaps making spillovers more likely. By contrast, when the probability of crisis rises gradually over time, investors can make adjustments to their portfolios in an orderly manner given that there are also likely to be still buyers in the market. Evidence from the behaviour of spreads and ratings downgrades in various economies in the period around crises (Chart 12) suggest that the recent events in Argentina were much more widely anticipated than earlier crises, such as that in Russia in 1998 and Korea in 1997. institutional investors, such as insurance companies. 22. The former may be forced into liquidating positions with short-term sales in a crisis, for example in order to meet margin calls. By contrast, the latter class of investors may be less vulnerable to shocks to asset returns because they tend to be less leveraged and have longer horizons.
Chart 12 Ratings downgrades during crises
Lessons for policymakers
The potential for problems in one EME to spread elsewhere is a central concern of policymakers in both EMEs and the wider international financial community. Economic theory suggests a range of potential crisis spillover mechanisms, both real and financial. In recent years, a substantial empirical literature has developed, attempting to disentangle which of these channels might have been the most important in past crises. These studies have offered mixed evidence, partly reflecting variations in the measurement of propagation channels, the definition of crisis spillover (or contagion) they adopt and the crisis period they are investigating. Moreover, few studies explicitly include an assessment of how specific linkages and country vulnerabilities might jointly determine the wider impact of EME shocks.
This paper suggests a more structural approach is needed for analysing the ex ante potential for spillovers from crisis economies. This surveillance framework involves shock identification, quantification of interlinkage from the crisis country to other EMEs, and assessment of EME vulnerability to any received shock. To this must be added consideration of the potential behavioural responses of investors and policymakers to the initial crisis and its transmission.
Our attempts to quantify potential intra-EME crisis spillover channels via trade and bank lending may help explain why empirical studies have varied in their conclusions about the causes of crises. Our estimates suggest that the strength of trade and financial channels between EMEs has changed over time. The importance of EME trade linkages has probably increased through time as trade openness has risen. But direct trade linkages-outside Asian EMEs-still remain weak relative to potential indirect trade links via competition in developed third markets. Financial linkages have also likely strengthened, although some key common creditors-such as Japan-have become less dominant sources of finance.
Like trade linkages, financial linkages are perhaps more likely to operate via major markets rather than via direct intra-EME finance, although our information on the latter is incomplete. Finally, although there are some notable exceptions, estimates suggest that both trade and financial linkages-even via developed countries-tend to follow regional patterns.
What are the implications of these findings for policymakers? Our case studies suggest that an ex ante surveillance framework based on analysis of joint incidences of interlinkages and relevant vulnerabilities can be a useful starting point for assessing the likelihood of a crisis spreading from one EME to another. As such our framework might be useful as a first pass tool for assessing where we should focus our attention in monitoring spillovers from EME crises. In this respect our work complements the increased focus of the IMF on strengthening its surveillance of country vulnerabilities, particularly through development of Early Warning Systems.
However, our case studies also highlight what we don't know about the spread of crises. Actual crisis dynamics are affected by a much richer range of factors. Some crises can sometimes spillover through mechanisms we have not been able to measure. For example, we have limited information on the operation of non-bank financial channels. And even for bank financial channels, theory offers us little guidance on how creditors will adjust their EME lending in the event of losses arising on part of their portfolio from an EME crisis. Analysis of the Argentine crisis suggests that further research on the behaviour of international investors towards EMEs is critical to assessing the likely future incidence of contagion.
Our findings also have implications for EMEs themselves. As suggested by King (2001) "…limitations on official finance mean that countries should think carefully about the provision of self-insurance against a liquidity crisis". Our framework suggests that insurance against external shocks might be especially important in EMEs with strong interlinkages and vulnerabilities. This might take the form of measures to build reserves, reduce short-term debt relative to longer-term debt and/or strengthen domestic balance sheets (as seen in Asian EMEs in recent years). It might also take the form of diversifying trade or finance sources as advocated by Chiang and Majnoni (2001) . In addition, EMEs might decide to arrange private contingent credit lines or initiate investor relation programmes to minimise the risk of financial outflows in periods of EME turbulence.
In summary, our analysis has highlighted the changing nature of contagious EME crises. Our framework potentially offers insights on how and why crises in individual EMEs might (or indeed might not) spread to other EMEs. But it also reveals some substantial gaps in our understanding of crisis spillovers, particularly those operating through shifts in investor behaviour in non-bank financial markets. Further work on these areas might shed light on the evolution of recent crises, help provide forward-looking tools for spotting incipient future crises, and potentially help policymakers identify measures that might prevent them.
